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ABSTRACT
The thesis begins with a qualitative description of the educational
computing environment. The environment is described as consisting of
three areas -- Administration, Research, and Classroom Support. After
discussing these three areas, their security requirements are examined
in terms of a simple framework. An attempt is made to separate physical
and operating system security requirements.
The various security requirements are compared, and it is asserted
that the solution of the problems of the Classroom Support Environment
effectively alleviates the problems of the other areas.
The MIT Class Monitor System, in conjunction with the IBM Resource
Security System (RSS), is used as an example of a trial solution to
these security requirements. In conclusion, some problems of the
adaptability of current operating systems to the Classroom Support
environment are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT
COMPUTERS AND EDUCATION
The explosive growth of the computer industry since the completion
of the ENIAC Computer in 1946 need not be described here. Virtually
every professional and institutional activity has been affected in
some way by this powerful and flexible tool. The business of education
is no exception. As more and more of the information processing
activities of modern educational institutions move to computer systems,
the -problem of security of programs and data becomes increasingly
important. This makes the educational environment a good one in which
to observe security problems and their implications.
Education comes, of course, at many different levels -- primary,
secondary, college, and graduate. If we divide the basic functions of
educational computing into administration, research, and classroom
support (this chapter discusses these areas in some detail), we can
compare the different levels of education in Figure 1. As can be seen
from this simple comparison, when the level of student ability increases
more types of processing become feasible, including individual research
and special programs for classroom support. Because the applications
found at the university level seem to include those of the lower levels,
it will be assumed here that higher education is a reasonably representative
segment of the educational environment.
For those who wish an extremely detailed and authoritative discussion
of the educational environment, there is a publication of the Rand
Corporation which gives an excellent summary. Most of this first
chapter is based upon that document, referred to here as the Rand Report.
The goal of this chapter is the presentation of the small portion of
the Rand Report which is necessary to provide the proper background
for our discussion.
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ADMINISTRATION
Within the educational environment, administrative data processing
can be subdivided into three categories for discussion. It is important
to realize that these categories represent only one of several break-
downs of this area. The Rand Study, for example, uses a slightly
different one.' The analysis in this paper is done from an information
security point of view, and thus has a functionally different set of
criteria for subdivision.
The first category is Corporate Processing, so called because it
is virtually identical to the central administrative data processing
of large corporations. The financial and accounting applications of
the institution are found here, as well as the personnel processing
common to all employers, such as employee payroll and benefits. In
addition, programs for resource allocation are often included, among
these being programs for scheduling classrooms and physical plant
operations (analagous to production scheduling in the business world).
In many ways this is the most "standard" of the various campus appli-
cations.
The second category is Student Processing. Here we find the set
of data processing functions which are unique to students. In some-
thing of a chronological order, we can name Admissions, Registrar,
Bursar, and Alumni Offices as groups which engage in Student Processing.
Although it may seem somewhat arbitrary to separate Admissions from, say,
the processing of applicants for jobs, it is in fact done almost without
,exception in universities. Even payrolls are kept separate, with
students and staff in separate runs. Further, from a security stand-
point, the school often has more confidential information on its students
than on its employees. Therefore, we keep Corporate and Student Pro-
cessing separate.
The final category is Departmental Processing. This subset of
administrative data processing is a direct outgrowth of the decentralized
departmental organization of most universities, and it includes many
of the same functions as Corporate and Student Processing. Graduate
admissions, for example, are commonly handled both at the departmental
and central level. Resource allocation is also handled as a cooperative
effort between the master schedulers in a central office, and the
departments who staff the various courses. Payroll, on the other hand,
is an example of a function which is generally not duplicated. However,
the department for which a faculty members teaches is likely to have to
worry about which account or research fund should be tapped for salary
and expenses, so that there is still some interaction. A great deal of
aggregate planning is done at the department level, in the design of
curricula and research programs. In summary, Departmental Processing
is a decentralized subset of administration which has a more microcosmic
view, and which requires interfacing with the central programs and
data bases in order to be effective.
Having examined the components of administrative data processing,
let us review some general characteristics of this area. This kind of
processing operates mostly on fixed short-term deadlines - registration
day, budget submission day, not to mention payday. This is often in
sharp contrast to the demands of Research or Classroom Support Processing,
which, as we shall see, are quite flexible. Such a need for accurate
timing dictates a high degree of system continuity and reliability.
The manager of such an operation is likely to be quite conservative,
a fact which underscores the similarity of this type of processing to
its industrial counterpart.
Another facet of this area which resembles commercial enterprise
is the accountability of managers for funds used. Because of the
relatively standard nature of the tasks being performed, techniques
have been established for their valuation and management. Further,
since the users of administrative systems are employees rather than
students, the resources of these facilities can be more closely (and
more formally) managed. An interesting sidelight here is the absence
of the "interesting area of research" syndrome, which often allows
feasibility studies to be bypassed in research when considering the
acquisition of new hardware or software. Thus innovation is more
difficult in the administrative area.
A final note, and one which is certainly important to this analysis,
is the need for security. It is clearly necessary to protest confidential
data on both students and staff from unauthorized disclosure. Further,
as i.n most corporate applications, it is essential to protect programs
and data bases from accidental or deliberate modification or deletion,
as well as to protect historical data files on tape or other media. A
wide spectrum of physical and programming measures are needed to
insure adequate protection.
The combination of differences in programming needs (e.g. FORTRAN
versus COBOL), the need for conservative, reliable, short-term service,
and the need for system security has led almost every university to
physically separate their administrative data processing facilities
from all others. This has automatically solved the majority of their
security problems so far. There is, however, a terrific price for this
security. First, the physical separation has necessitated duplication
of hardware and programming staffs. In an era of budget throttling and
cost cutting, this tends to be very unpopular. Second, and perhaps
more subtle, is the fact that their deliberate isolation from the
facilities utilized by Research and Classroom Support systems has meant
that the administrators have been isolated from the technological
progress being made in these areas. Although one would not expect this
type of processing to keep up with the forefront of research (nor would
this be desired from the standpoint of continuity and reliability, as
mentioned earlier) the gap between the two technologies has been allowed
to widen to such an extent that even if all security problems were
solved tomorrow, it would be several years before most administrative
facilities would be able to consider a merger of any sort with existing
research facilities. The M.I.T. Office of Administrative Information
Systems is a.good example of this problem.2
One interesting exception to this general notion is Departmental
Processing. Because this processing is at the department level where
a large supply of cheap, high-quality labor exists (thesis students),
more and more work is being done on these applications. Oddly enough,
because the students who work on such projects do not have access to
the administrative facilities, the work has been forced onto the newer
research facilities, with the expected benefit of the newer technology.
Thus we see information systems for management and aggregate planning
being developed, for example, in the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T.3
which far outstrip the capacity of the'central administrative facility
in the sophistication of information handling techniques. However,
these applications are in desperate need of solutions to the security
problems which the central facility solved by physical separation. Thus
we find the departments pioneering applications for the central facility
by pushing into research facilities with innovative and complex planning
systems which will force the security problems to be faced, probably
well in advance of the needs of the central facility.
It should be note, in conclusion, that there are two possible ways
for the administrators to proceed. First, they may find it advantageous
to combine facilities with the administrative organizations of other
universities. An example of this type of venture is WICHE (the Western
Interstate Commission on Higher Education), which combines many
universities in the design of standard administrative programs.4
This would provide a stable system, and also promote innovation through
common development of systems. However, the problem of security still
exists, since many schools would be sharing common hardware if this
cooperation were carried to its logical conclusion. The other alterna-
tive seems to be merger into a central campus computing facility either
as a complete move, or as a remote "satellite" facility. This brings
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more risks in terms of system instability, but has the advantage of
allowing a much smoother interface among the various kinds of central
and departmental programs. In any case, it seems clear that over the
next five years, security problems will come to the point where they
can no longer be avoided.
RESEARCH
Computer Science students (and faculty) tend sometimes to describe
the campus as composed of two types of people -- those who understand
computers, and those who wish they did. Although this is a distinction
which is sometimes difficult to make, it does have some relevance in
describing research on today's campus. A more reasonable way of making
the distinction for our purposes is to describe Research Processing
as composed of research on computers, and research with computers.
The former category is composed mostly of computer scientists, electrical
engineers, and a few computer-oriented information systems specialists.
The latter includes more of the campus every day, and even now, on the
MIT campus, there is not a single department (including the Music Depart-
ment) where the impact of the computer has not been felt heavily.
There are, of course, other distinctions which could be made here,
for example, thesis versus non-thesis research, and sponsored versus
non-sponsored. While we may uiake these distinctions here as examples
of different accounting methods, our primary emphasis will be upon the
differences between research on and with computers. This emphasis
allows us to focus on the security aspects of research processing.
By nature, Research Processing is highly decentralized. This is
primarily due to thesis projects, which are generally pursued individually
under the supervision of an advisor or committee. In terms of the
number of persons participating, this constitutes more than half of
the research effort of most universities. In addition to extreme
,decentralization, Research Processing can be characterized by a lack
of definite deadlines. This is quite intuitive -- one can hardly set
deadlines on pure research and development. The kinds of time constraints
generally encountered are in the form of arbitrary limits such as project
expiration dates and thesis deadlines, which are generally quite flexible.
A related facet of managing research efforts is the idea of funds allo-
cation. When examining administrative processing, we observed the
formal structure for financial accountability. A different problem is
encountered with the thesis user. Generally, the thesis user is not
spending personal funds on computing. The department will often have
a set procedure for computer resource allocation. The problem occurrs
when the user consumes the full amount, and is not finished. It
seems absurd to think that the student must quit. Somehow, more funding
must be obtained. Control of not only the allocation of funds, but
the use of funds thus becomes a problem.
A related problem is the expertise of the individual user. The
researcher who is a computer specialist is likely to have computer
expertise which permits efficient use of the computer resources, while
the person who merely wants the computer as a tool for other research
may be totally unfamiliar with the proper methodology, thus wasting
vast amounts of money. Further, it is possible that the non-computer
researcher may be unwilling to invest time in learning efficient
techniques. From this perspective, we must realize that these users
have their own priorities, and it is quite realistic to assume that
the computer should not be allowed to detract appreciably from their
'primary goals of research in their selected field.
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The last aspect of Research Processing to be discussed here is
a mixed blessing. Certainly, the campus has been the scene of the
most significant advances in computer technology -- the computer itself,
core memory, software systems such as the MIT Compatible Time Sharing
System (CTSS) and others. In addition, the research on computers
within a given campus community often results in "tuning" improvements
within existing equipment, such as improved device management, scheduling
algorithms, etc. Sometimes, entire new systems such as the MULTICS
system at MIT, become available to the community as a direct outgrowth
of campus research. However, this technological fallout has two bad
effects. First, educational systems tend even more than others to
become "tailored" with a series of modifications which render them
incompatible with all other systems. Second, when new resources are
introduced,there ensues a great deal of contention about system stability
and documentation for general use. The classic example of this problem
is the development of the MULTICS System at MIT from 1968-1971. During
this time, the system underwent constant "tuning" changes, as well as
several major revisions. The stability of the system was very poor,
and thus many non-computer users who wanted the machine for service
were in direct contention with the systems development people, who
wanted constant improvement.
For purposes of this discussion, the Research Processing area can
be regarded as an extremely decentralized group of users, whose
expertise ranges from superlative to negligible. It is characterized
by a lack of structure both from time and budget perspectives. Finally,
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we find the research on computer sometimes requires experimentation at
a machine level which can seriously conflict with the standard service
needs of the rest of the research community.
CLASSROOM SUPPORT
The most recent of the three areas is the emerging use of the
computer in support of classroom activity. Although this type of pro-
cessing won early attention in the form of the much heralded "interactive
teaching program", this particular use proved disappointing. Early
enthusiasm toward the replacement of the more mechanical aspects of
teaching with time-sharing systems waned in the face of severe problems
of human interface design and language processing problems both at the
syntactic and semantic levels.
In recent years, the computer has begun an important and many
faceted role in the classroom environment. It comes to the classroom
both as subject and tool. We shall divide Classroom Support Processing
along these lines, into support for computer courses and support for
non-computer courses. The reason for this breakdown is a fundamental
difference in the teaching objectives of these two areas, which is
reflected in the type of activity produced.
There exist within the curricula of most large universities a
set of courses designed to teach computer programming and other aspects
of systems design and utilization. Whether the computer is being taught
in its own right or in the context of some application such as mechanical
engineering, the orientation of such courses is toward the exploration
of the capabilities and limitations of the computer system. This focus
upon the computer results in a great deal of student use, and, as we
shall see, in a serious security problem from imaginative and mischevious
student programmers.
In contrast to the computer courses, a rapidly-growing segment
of the computer resources on campus are being consumed by students who
have no interest whatever in computers or programming. These students
are using pre-packaged programs which perform simulations, linear
programming algorithms, and other computations which aid the students
in their work. A good example of this type of program is the area of
financial management, where a student might have access to small utility
programs for present value analysis and discounting, as well as large
packages for linear programming and modeling. The important distinction
here is that the non-computer student is neither trained in nor (in
most cases) interested in the computer. Thus the kind of in-depth explor-
ation of the computer system characteristic of computer courses is not
found here. However, from the security point of view, we find a different
problem -- the control of large numbers of inexperienced and sometimes
indifferent users. As we shall see, there is an implied problem of
usage control by the instructor, who must see that the class budget is
efficiently and equitably distributed.
In summary, we have divided the educational computing environment
into three areas: Administration, Research, and Classroom Support. A
schematic diagram (Figure 2) shows the overall breakdown, along with
some rough figures on each area as a percent of total activity. One
other dimension along which computation will be viewed here is that
of batch versus interactive. All of the categories in our schematic
diagram can be regarded as existing in a continuum which has batch
monoprogramming at one end, followed by multiprogramming, limited inquiry
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FIGURE 2: A SCHEMATIC OF THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
NOTE: An estimate of the three areas as a percentage of total university data 5processing expenditure is included. (A,B) indicates the percentage in 1967 ,
and the author's estimate of the percentage in 1973, reflecting a
relative increase in Classroom Support Processing. 2% is allowed for other uses.
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systems, and finally interactive systems at the opposite end. The reason
for this view is the difference in security requirements, for example,
the problem of collection and distribution of decks in a batch environ-
ment versus terminal access control in timesharing systems.
The next chapter will discuss a framework for describing security
requirements of our three areas in terms of this framework.
CHAPTER 2 - COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY
SECURITY -- THREATS AND PROMISES
The notion of security, whether in computer systems or in some
other context, is one of those topics which eludes positive definition.
People tend to' describe security negatively, for example, security is
not having your house broken into, or not having your medical records
printed in the Boston Globe. It is not required here (thank goodness)
that we arrive at a definition which will be accepted with great
finality by all readers. However, it is essential that some working
definition be developed which will facilitate the comparison of the
security requirements of the different areas described in Chapter 1,
as well as permit a general discussion of computer system security.
Let S denote an "ideal" computer system, one which provides
uninterruptable and fully controlled service, and in which all data
and programs are available only to authorized users, and only in a
particular mode. Let OUT denote all of the effects which the system
has on its environment, including work performed, output generated,
and work generated for its staff (such as the modification of erroneous
programs). Now let IN be the total input of the environment to the
computer, including decks submitted, temperature of the room, etc. We
now define T, (threats) a subset of IN which will cause "undesirable
abberations" in the operations of S, and result in unacceptable results
in-OUT. Finally, we define SS as the security system, that part of S
designed specifically to screen T from IN, insuring the desired operation
of S, and thus the desired OUT.
While the notion of an "ideal" computer system is, admittedly a
vague one, it does serve us well enough to establish the nature and
function of computer security. Whatever we define as our desired system,
computer system security is the ability to prevent it from being
changed. One distinction which should be made here is the difference
between programming errors and system errors. It is perfectly consistent
with the notion of an "ideal" system to expect it to generate errors in
the output of jobs whose input is incorrect. To execute exactly the
program submitted is all we may ask (for the present) of any system.
The system deviates from its desired performance when, for example,
the accidental or intentional errors of some task are permitted to
interfere with the execution of supposedly independent tasks. Thus
we see security as the act of maintaining a set of system-wide relation-
ships among programs, data, processes, users, and other system entities
which define a computer system. A secure computer system, then is one
which promises that its security mechanism SS is capable of dealing
with every component of T without failure, insuring consistent performance
of. the system S.
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THREATS - THEIR ORIGIN AND TARGETS
Having defined security in terms of coping with threats to the
system, we now turn to the problem of classifying those threats. The
first qualifier would logically seem to be the source, or origin of
the threat. There are several different dimensions along which the
source of a threat can be viewed. In a company, for example, threats
could be classified as originating within the firm, or outside. For
our purposes, however, we seek a dimension independent of the purpose
of the machine, and one which is relevant to the organization of the
computer system itself. Therefore, we will regard threats as originating
in one of three modes:
1) EXTERNAL MODE
2) SUPERVISOR MODE
3) USER MODE
The first mode, EXTERNAL, reflects all threats which do not involve
the execution of an instruction under control of the operating system.
This includes most of the kinds of security problems referred to in
the literature as "physical problems," such as fire, vandalism, theft
of tapes, etc. It also includes the type of programs known as "back-
ground utilities" where the accidental mounting of a wrong disk pack
can result in loss of good data through accidental initialization. In
this case the threat is not under the control of the computer system,
but is in direct control of an operator, who mounts a pack and pushes
a button. Power surges are another common type of problem which
originates outside the system frame,
instructions.
The two remaining modes, SUPER
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One example of a Supervisor Mode threat is the IBM Attached Support
Processor (ASP). In the current version of ASP being used at MIT in
conjunction with the IBM Resource Security System (RSS), ASP runs in
Supervisor State, with all protection disabled. In addition to being
one of the less dependable parts of the operation system, ASP is
generally modified by the local programming support staff to a large
extent. Any bugs in ASP have an excellent chance of clobbering the
operating system, since protection is disabled. Thus we see that there
can be threats from within the Supervisor Mode. Threats may also origi-
nate, of course, from the programs which run in User Mode. Common
threats of this type include the attempt to switch to Supervisor Mode
without authorization, and the issuing of invalid requests to system
service routines. (One of the classic examples of this in the System 360
is requesting the system clock to deposit the current time into the
middle of the operating system programs, which it does without checking.)
In summary, we have categorized threats according to their origins,
into those external to the computer itself, those internal to the
computer and its privileged mode of operation, and those internal to
the computer in normal operating mode. Having established where the
threats are coming from, let us turn our attention to their targets.
For our purposes, it is convenient to divide threats into two
major categories:
1) Threats against Operating System and Subsystem Integrity
2) Threats against dataset access control.
We shall not attempt the impossible task of enumerating all of the
possible threats against a computer system. We will instead mention
some of the salient types of threats, and note their places in our
framework. Hopefully, this will enable the reader to insert particular
cases which have been omitted here. The breakdown of our two major
categories is outlined in Figure 3. As can be seen, Operating System
and Subsystem Integrity includes a wide range of system functions,
including accounting and control functions, as well as system stability.
One important feature of this category is its recursive nature. All
of the kinds of features inherent in system-wide operation, such as
accounting, validation, and continuity also occur in subsystems, to an
extent which depends upon the sophistication and design objectives of
the subsystem. An example of system and subsystem integrity problems
is the design of an interactive program for use under CP/CMS (Control
Program / Cambridge Monitor System, a set of software used on the IBM 360
Model 67). The environment is shown in Figure.4. As can be seen, there
are three levels of system, each with a separate set of control and
accounting problems: first, the CP System, which provides a virtual
machine environment which must be protected and isolated, second, the
CMS System, which provides the command language and file system
and must manage requests, and finally, the interactive program, which
might have its own accounting and complete user environment to support
and protect.
OPERATING SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM INTEGRITY
1) Accounting Mechanisms
2) User Validation
3) Priority and Process Scheduling
4) Integrity of Actual Code
5) Memory Access Control
6) Continuity of Operation
DATASET ACCESS CONTROL
1) Read
2) Write
3) Execute
4) Append
5) Delete
6) Restrict Access to specific programs
7) Control of access to offline files
(tapes, cards, etc.)
FIGURE 3: TARGET CATEGORIES
FIGURE 4: THREE-TIERED USER ENVIRONMENT
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The other category of target is Dataset Access Control, where we
define datasets in the most general sense as aggregations of data
(or instructions), which may be either on-line, or off-line in the
form of cards, tapes or printout. Here we find the conventional read,
write, and other access categories for online datasets, as well as
the full range of physical access controls necessary for offline files.
All control of programs and data within the computer system (with
the exception of those programs and data specifically designated as
protected parts of the operating system) are thus placed in this category.
A schematic diagram showing the relationship between the origins
and targets of several sample threats appears in Figures 5 and 6.
Having outlined our security framework, we will now turn to a brief
comparison of the security requirements of the educational environment.
FIGURE 5: SCHEMATIC OF EXAMPLE THREATS
(SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM INTEGRITY SHOWN SEPARATELY)
(SEE FIGURE 6 FOR KEY)
EXAMPLES OF SECURITY THREATS
1 A power surge.
2 A tape is stolen from the library.
3 A user shuts off a dedicated terminal in a retrieval system.
4 A bug in the operating system causes a core lockup.
5 When no more space is available in the OS-360 job queue, new jobs
are entered on top of jobs already in the queue, thus destroying
spooled input before they can be processed.
6 The teleprocessing access method interprets a line error as an
"attention" interrupt, and discontinues the program in progress.
7 User gives the time of day command a bad address, causing it to
overwrite part of the OS.
8 In OS-360, users have almost unlimited access to delete datasets,
even those belonging to others.
9 A user enters a character in a numeric input line and causes the
program to end.
FIGURE 6: EXAMPLE THREATS
SECURITY IN EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING
Given our simple framework for classifying threats, the most
convenient way of surveying the security requirements of the educational
computing environment seems to be the use of the simple charts shown
in Figures 7, 8, and 9. These charts outline the most important
aspects of the three areas defined in Chapter 1. They will be supple-
mented by brief individual discussions here, followed by some general
observations on the environment as a whole.
The Administrative area, as expected, has minimized many of the
threat categories by its use of standard hardware and software, and
its restriction of users (almost all are members of the programming
staff). However, two areas are important here. First, External Dataset
Access threats are extremely important, due to the large number of
confidential and historical datasets, and the large amount of physical
handling of these files. Also, threats from User Mode to Dataset Access
come from the possibility of programming errors within the staff, as
well as large scale possibilities if facilities were shared with other
areas.
As we move into the Research area, we find the security requirements
increasing, for two major reasons: first, the use of non-standard hard-
ware and software vastly increases the potential threat from External
and Supervisor Mode respectively, and second, the great increase in the
number of users, and the corresponding decrease in control, makes User
'Mode Security much more important. While it is true that for most
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researchers, their preoccupation with their research makes tampering
with the system unlikely, it is also true that for those who are
researching computers at the most basic level, some simulation or
virtual machine support is necessary if they are to use common facilities.
This implies a great deal of subsystem support. Overall, we find our
security problems expanding.
The last area, Classroom Support, carries the research problems
one step further -- even greater numbers of students, some of whom
are "hackers", and all of the problems inherited from attempting to
gain from Research technology in the form of hardware or software mod-
ifications. We find here the full range of educational security problems.
External, Supervisor, and User Modes seem very well filled out with
standard and experimental equipment, and cooperative and malicious users.
There are clearly discrepancies in importance between compromising
the solutions to a problem set and the medical records of students. If,
however, one sets aside the intrinsic value of the information, and
observes the security profile, it can be asserted that all of the
security problems of the educational environment show up within the
Classroom Support enviornment. it follows, then, that a computer system
which satisfactorally solved those problems for the Classroom environment
would be a satisfactory system for general use.
The remainder of this thesis deals with a specific aspect of the
Classroom Support environment, namely, the creation of a monitor subsystem
to allow controlled timesharing in a secure student environment.
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External and Supervisor Mode threats will be left for other research,
and we will concentrate here on the implementation of a subsystem which
must deal directly with User Mode threats in a timesharing environment.
CHAPTER 3 - THE CLASS MONITOR SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses one attempt to satisfy the need for controlled
timesharing for Classroom Support Processing, The Class Monitor System
for OS-360/TSO (Time Sharing Option) was implemented during the Summer
of 1972 at MIT. In order to explain its design features and implementa-
tion strategy, it is first necessary to briefly describe the TSO
environment at MIT.
The MIT Computation Center runs OS Release 21 with TSO on a System
370 Model 165 with 1.5 megabytes of core storage. Several 3330 Disk
Drives are available, as well as two 2301 Drums for swapping and system
datasets. A hybrid of ASP (Attached Support Processor) and LASP (Local
Attached Support Processor) is used in support of the Main 165. Although
several MIT modifications have been made to the system, the basic struc-
ture and user interface of TSO remain standard (see [8,9]). It should
be noted here that MIT has a standard dataset naming convention for
user datasets, which reflects the account number and programmer to be
billed for the online starage. A standard MIT/TSO dataset might have
the following name:
U.M1 34.9999.HEWITT.FORT
11CZFT F PROGRAMMER NUMBER FORTRAN SOURCE
ARBITRARY NAMEACCOUNT NUMBER
Each programmer on the system has a unique programmer number, and each
project is assigned a unique account (or problem) number. Thus, only
valid problem-programmer combinations are accepted within the system.
Under TSO, a unique problem programmer number is associated with each
USERID-PASSWORD combination, and the prefix "U.PROB.PROG" is automati-
cally added to all dataset references (see [8] for details of TSO
dataset conventions).
Under standard TSO, as might be expected, "all users are created
equal." That is, each entry in the User Attribute Data Set (UADS) is
assumed to be a "full" user, with all of the priviledges available to
users of the system. The only exceptions to the notion of the standard
user are users whose UADS entry contains either an administrative or
operator flag. Thus all standard users have the same command repertoire
and dataset access rights. Under OS-360, these dataset access rights
are quite extensive, since they include all datasets in the system.
In fact, there are currently anly two ways to remove access to datasets
in the system -- first, they may be password protected (a clumsy and not
often used facility), and second, the physical device containing the
dataset may be placed in read-only mode (this is done at MIT with the
system residence volume). Note that the second method cannot protect
against read access, while even the first cannot hide the existence
and location (volume serial number) of the dataset in question. Thus
we see that the standard TSO user has a quite potent facility at his
command, which includes the ability to modify or delete more than 90%
of the datasets on the system, either accidentally or deliberately.
Rounding out our discussion of standard users, consider the administration
of USERID's within the system. The central user accounting office must
handle both batch and TSO accounting. At any given time, there are
several thousand active combinations of problem-programmer numbers,
as well as hundreds of valid TSO USERID's. As classroom use of computers
increases, the-potential load on this office is obvious -- several
thousand students, each involved in several courses, combine to produce
many thousands of USERID-PASSWORD combinations. If we assume that the
instructor in any given course would probably exercise fairly tight
control over the course budget, the workload of the central office in
closely overseeing all users becomes immense.
The Classroom Support Environment lends itself naturally to decentral-
ized control of computer resources. Since the student users are already
organized into classes, it seems logical to allow the person in charge
of a particular class to allocate computer resources in any desired
manner. Further, some controls should be provided for the class
adminstrator to insure that the class budget is spent equitably. For
example, in the current MIT accounting system (which, although primitive,
is not unlike many university centers), if a class of ten students were
each assigned standard TSO USERID's, all ten users would be billed
against the class budget for the course. Now since they are "full"
users, there is absolutely nothing to prevent a student from logging
onto the system, and using it to create, compile, and run FORTRAN decks
instead of executing the desired tutorial program. Moreover, since all
users in the class are being billed against the master budget (a separate
account for each user is unthinkable) a single enthusiastic student
can play until the entire budget is consumed, preventing the other none
students from ever logging on at all. This rather disturbing scenario
at least had the advantage of assuming non-hostile intentions on the
part of the student. If a student who wished to cause trouble was
released on the system, almost every user dataset on the system could
be deleted without fear of discovery.
It is clear that there is a need for a subsystem which can achieve
the dual purpose of relieving the central accounting office and providing
control of student users. Figure 10 indicates an expanded set of design
goals, which will be discussed individually. Following that discussion,
the implementation of the MIT Class Monitor will be described.
DESIGN GOALS FOR CLASS MONITOR
1) Get immediate and uninterruptable control at logon.
2) Validate users and log invalid users completely
off the system.
3) Give the valid user a pre-designated "subset" of
full TSO.
4) Protect itself and its files.
5) Handle user file maintenance.
6) Get uninterruptable control at logoff or console
shutoff.
7) Handle on-line accounting.
8) Provide a mechanism for maintenance of the master
accounting file.
9) Have low operating overhead.
10) Be easy to use for inexperienced students.
11) Be easy to maintain for center personnel.
FIGURE 10: DESIGN GOALS FOR CLASS MONITOR
GOALS OF THE MONITOR
No matter how we implement our system, it is still necessary to
use the concept of the TSO USERID. Now, however, we assign several
"open" USERID's to our class, and install the Class Monitor in each
one. The first goal of our system, then, is that the Class Monitor
must intercept the standard logon in some manner, and gain control of
the logon session, thus encapsulating the user in a new environment
immediately, and without failure.
Since we have given out "open" USERID's, the process of validation
and account balance checking must be undertaken by the Class Monitor
logon processor, so that only valid users are admitted. If students
fail to give the proper identification, they must be logged off the
computer system. Note that the USERID had to have been logged completely
onto the TSO system before the execution of the CMS processor could
begin. Therefore it is necessary for CMS to fire a direct call to the
system logoff routine to prevent the user from taking any action prior
to being logged off the system.
Having admitted the student to CMS, we now face the problem of
control. The Monitor must be able to allocate to the user only those
commands which are necessary to do the assigned work, and in a manner
which will make it difficult to perform any but the intended tasks. As
will be seen later, extreme care must be taken to avoid giving the
user commands with which he may bootstrap into a more powerful environ-
ment. For example, if we give the user a restricted command library,
and also the ability to copy command processors, the user will simply
copy more powerful commands into the library and then execute them.
This is a difficult area in the design of subsystems which attempt to
contain student users.
If the Monitor is to have online accounting, as well as a command
library of some sort, it is clear that these datasets must be protected
from user tampering. Further, it is desirable that the existence of
such files be hidden from the user, to eliminate the temptation of
such tampering.
Perhaps the most difficult area for the monitor system is the
handling of user file maintenance. First, we encounter the problem
of giving the user the ability to create and delete datasets. This
entails releasing commands which constitute a direct threat to other
datasets on the system. Second, many interactive teaching programs
use online datasets to save intermediate results between logon sessions.
Thus we should like to provide some means of creating and deleting
datasets from within a higher level language such as FORTRAN or PL1.
Finally, we encounter the problem of billing the individual student
for dataset space, since the entire file maintenance system of IPC TSO
is built around the notion that all of the files under one USERID
should be treated as a single group. Ideally, the Monitor should allow
for program control of dataset allocation, automatic distinction
between different students' files under the same USERID, and billing
procedures for these files.
It is essential that the Monitor get uninterruptable control at
logoff time, to insure a clean CMS termination, and proper billing
at the student level. Further, it is essential that control be
received in the event of an abnormal termination such as console shutoff
or telephone disconnect, since these events could easily bypass the
subsystem accounting mechanism.
The notion of online accounting is important for class use. This
is primarily true due to the scarcity of computer resources at this
level. The MIT TSO system does not, at this time, have online account-
ing, primarily for reasons of security. That system produces punched
card records of each logon session, and performs a daily update Monday
through Friday. With the limited resources available to classroom users,
a student could easily log on several times during a weekend, and
consume much more than the parcel of time alloted, knowing that the
billing would not catch up until Monday. This is quite unsatisfactory
for the classroom environment. In fact, there is some reason to believe
that the accounting should be done periodically during the logon
session, so that the session could be terminated when the balance reached
zero instead of waiting for LOGOFF processing to update the balance.
At the very least, the Monitor must compute a reasonably accurate cost
figure for the session, update an online accounting file, and display
both the session cost and balance to the user, so that the students may
budget their time properly.
Closely related to the notion of online accounting is the ability
to maintain this file by adding or deleting users, allocating funds,
changing passwords, printing reports, etc. All of these standard
maintenance functions must be provided in conversational form so that
the class administrator can maintain the file without assistance from
the central accounting office.
The final three design goals are common to all types of subsystems.
Obviously, the Monitor must not consume large amounts of computer time
in providing the student environment, or the benefits of this environment
will be outweighed by its consumption of resources. Since the Monitor
is to be used by students of all disciplines, it must provide a set of
interactions which are extremely straightforward, so that there is
little chance of confusing inexperienced students (who tend to be
somewhat frightened of the computer). Finally, the Monitor must be
easily maintained, since the programming support staffs of the university
generally have a fairly high turnover rate.
We have now outlineda set of design goals for a Classroom Support
subsystem. In the second half of this chapter, we will discuss the
implementation of the MIT Class Monitor System, which attempts to
achieve these goals.
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THE MIT CLASS MONITOR SYSTEM
The Class Monitor System consists of three major components:
LOGON PROCESSING
SESSION CONTROL
LOGOFF PROCESSING
We will examine each of these components and the implementation
strategy used, concluding with a summary of the strengths and weaknesses
of the system as currently available.
When a TSO user logs onto the system, the Terminal Monitor Program
(TMP) is invoked. This is the standard IBM control program, which
supervises the console session. It is the TMP which accepts and executes
all user commands. The TMP also has a very important feature which
we use to get control. At the beginning of the console session, the TMP
looks at the PARM field of the EXEC statement which invokes it. (see
[10] for details on the operation of the invocation process and catalogued
procedure used). If any non-blank characters are present in this field,
they are placed into the Command Buffer, and taken as the first command
line to be executed. Further, no information is accepted from the
terminal until this first command is processed to completion. This
includes processing of "attention" interruptions, which are suspended
until the first command terminates normally, and until the TMP issues
the first READY message to the console.
The availibility of the "first command" option means that the
Monitor can specify a single load module which will be executed before
any user intervention is permitted. This load module must, of course,
contain the CMS user validation scheme, as well as some ability to
assure that invalid users are logged off the system. As a matter of
convenience, the Master File Update Routine is included as a subroutine
in the LOGON module, thus allowing us to implement this version of the
Monitor using only two load modules, one at logon, and one at logoff.
The modules are both written in PL1. Figures 11, 12, and 13 give the
basic flowcharts of the system, and each one will now be explained.
Figure 11 depicts the operation of the LOGON processor. A
standard TSO "nopass" option is used for all TSO CMS USERID's which
allows the invocation of the TMP without a TSO password, that is, TSO
logon is accomplished by merely typing "LOGON USERID." At this time,
when finished with initialization, the TMP passes control to the CMS
LOGON routine. The first function performed is the basic user valida-
tion. CMS uses group numbers for user identification. This was done
so that the class administrator would not have to cope with both
USERID's and passwords. Under this scheme, the administrator may
assign group numbers based on a signup list or class roll sheet, and
either assign or collect unique passwords. This scheme also tends to
assist students by giving them a number instead of a character
string as their identifier. If they forget their password, they can
always identify themselves to the administrator by group number and get
their memory refreshed. The user is given two tries to enter a valid
MO
MACRO FLOWCHART OF CMS LOGON ROUTINEFIGURE 11:
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group number/password combination. If unsuccessful, the user is logged
off the system completely. This is made possible by the mechanism of
the system logoff routine. It is called directly from within the LOGON
processor, and simply turns on a bit in one of the system control blocks
for the process. Whenever control is returned to the TMP, this bit
is automatically checked, and if on, causes the logon session to be
cancelled. Since control is returned directly from the LOGON processor
to the TMP, this screening method cannot be subverted. The next task
is to determine the account balance. If there is any money left in
the account, the user continues processing. If not, an appropriate
message is printed, and the user is logged off. At this time, we are
certain that the user is a valid one, either a student user or an
administrator. We must now solve an important problem caused by the
modular nature of TSO.
Although we now know the valid user's group number, as soon as
the LOGON processor is finished executing, all of the current information
disappears as a new program is fetched into the TSO region for execution.
How, then, does the LOGOFF processor know which group number to charge
for the session? It is clearly undesirable to have the group number
and password reentered at the end of the session. The problem is solved
using the User Profile Table, one of the control tables which remain
in use throughout the session, and in which, for example, the characters
for character and line deletion are recorded. Several bytes of installa-
tion-usable space are reserved in this table, and one halfword is used
to record the group number. Each time the TMP invokes a command, the
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address of this table is passed in the argument list. This allows our
LOGON and LOGOFF commands to communicate.
Having recorded the identity of the user, we check an administrative
flag in the accounting record. If the user has administrative privileges,
we give him an opportunity to access the Master File for maintenance.
Otherwise, we simply return to the TMP, our work completed. If the
user accesses the Master File, we return to the TMP when finished.
The Master File Access Routine is a PLl procedure callable from
the LOGON processor. It is simply a conversational file maintenance
routine, which provides the obviously necessary functions of adminis-
tration, such as adding and removing group numbers, changing passwords,
allocating money, printing reports, etc. Most of the programming and
design involved are relatively mundane, and available to the interested
reader in the CMS Programmer's Guide.1 One feature which is relevant
here, however, is the hierarchical scheme currently employed for
administration. Users are classified either as non-administrative (no
access to Master File), administrators (access to the records of all
student users in the file), and super-users (access to all records in
the file). Without judging the merits of the scheme, it is interesting
to note that almost all subsystems of this nature possess the "deity
syndrome", that is, there is always one particular user (in this system
called a 'super-user'), who has absolute accessing rights to all infor-
mation within the system. This usually starts as a protective measure
during the debugging stages of the development, when it is clearly
advantageous to have an override mechanism for emergencies. But somehow,
as time goes on, this facility is never removed, so that the creator
of the system always has "the power". It is likewise true of CMS that
the current CMS administrator has absolute access to all Master Files
for all classes. Since the class administrator is often an inexperienced
student assistant, it has been found that the override facility has
been very useful so far.
LOGON processing, then, includes user validation and screening,
account checking, posting of group numbers, and Master File access for
administrators. Control is then returned to the TMP.
When the TMP regains control from the CMS LOGON processor, the
system logoff bit is immediately checked. If this bit is set, the
session is terminated. If not, the user is presumed to be valid, and
a READY message is issued to the terminal. (For a description of
the CMS LOGON and LOGOFF user interface, see [12].) At this point,
we are at the TSO READY State. This is often referred to in other
timesharing systems as the Supervisor Level, or Command Level. When
a user is in READY state, the TMP is ready to process commands from
the terminal.
Having performed the necessary functions at LOGON, we are now
faced with the problem of controlling the user console session, as
depicted in Figure 12. As noted earlier, we would like to give the
user the absolute minimum number of commands necessary to perform the
assigned task. In doing so, we would like to use standard TSO commands
as much as possible, so that when a user has a question about a command,
all of the existant TSO documentation (such as the Command Language
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Reference Manual) will still be relevant. The procedure then, is to
start with the standard set of TSO commands, and simply remove those
that are not needed. This turns out to be an extremely easy task,
because of the straightforward way in which TSO processes commands.
When a command line is sent to the Command Buffer for processing, the
TMP has a standard search path for locating the proper program to
fetch. The part that concerns us here is the location of the commands
themselves. They all reside in a partitioned dataset called SYS1.CMDLIB.
Each command is a separate member of the dataset, with its command name
and abbreviations corresponding to a member name and aliai. In order
to restrict the commands available to the user, we simply copy the
desired subset of the TSO commands into a new partitioned dataset, and
substitute that dataset into the search path in place of the standard
command library. The DDNAME of this new dataset is LIMITLIB, and the
TMP is modified to make the substitution. Thus we tailor the command
set of a given class by varying the members of the LIMITLIB used for
that class. When commands are requested which are not included in
LIMITLIB, the standard TSO error message "COMMAND XXXX NOT FOUND" is
.received.
For some applications, the LIMITLIB alone is a satisfactory solution
to our control problems. However, in many cases it is necessary to
allocate and delete datasets in order to run instructional programs. If
we release the ALLOCATE and DELETE commands to users for this purpose,
then they will be able to allocate any datasets they wish (or accidentally
allocate large datasets by incorrectly specifying the allocation para-
meters) as well as delete any dataset on the system, Therefore we use
the TSO EXEC feature, which allows us to store commands in a dataset
for execution., Then we rename the commands we need, placing the re-
named members in LIMITLIB, and using the new commands in our EXEC file.
Finally, we remove the option of the EXEC command which allows the
command dataset to be listed, so that the user cannot learn the new
command names (otherwise, the user could simply invoke them from LIMITLIB
by their new names). This procedure allows us to include commands in
LIMITLIB which are too powerful to give to the user, providing that we
are careful to avoid giving out the ability to discover the new command
names. The LIMITLIB dataset and the EXEC command, then, provide user
control during the console session.
At the end of the console session, CMS must get control to perform
accounting functions and print charges. This is accomplished by in-
serting a CMS module into LIMITLIB as LOGOFF. The flowchart for LOGOFF
is shown in Figure 13. When the user types the command LOGOFF, the
CMS module is fetched instead of the standard system program. After
CMS performs its accounting functions, it calls the system logoff routine,
assuring that when control is returned to the TMP, a normal session
termination will occur.
Referring back to Figure 10, let us evaluate the current version
of the Monitor in light of our design goals. Following that, we will
discuss some of the security aspects of the Monitor.
We have seen that CMS LOGON gets the desired control at logon time,
and properly validates all users. The combination of LIMITLIB and EXEC
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provides the ability to tailor the TSO command language. Protection
is accomplished mainly by hiding essential commands and datasets from
the user. At the present time, no file maintenance is performed by
CMS, due to the lack of an interface between higher level languages
and DAIR (Dynamic Allocation Interface Routine). Several schemes are
being studied to implement a file subsystem. The LOGOFF routine gets
control when the user issues a logoff request. In Version 2 of the
Monitor, abnormal termination such as console shutoff will also be
handled. Online accounting and Master File maintenance are provided.
The system has proven to be extremely easy to use and maintain, due to
its modular design and close resemblance to normal TSO. Finally, the
overhead has been measured at approximately one dollar per student
session, and this figure will be reduced in the next version.
SECURITY AND THE MONITOR
Although the Class Monitor has proved a useful tool in non-computer
courses at MIT, it is of limited value in the control of computer-
oriented courses due to its vulnerability. It lacks protection in two
major areas.
First, since the datasets used to implement the monitor are simply
normal user datasets, they may be edited, listed, or deleted by other
"full" TSO users. A specific example of this occurred last fall, when
a staff member at the Computation Center, in an effort to assist a
Class Monitor user, listed his EXEC files using a command not available
within LIMITLIB. Thus the code names (and access) to all commands
were given to this user. Further, students who are given full TSO
access for thesis projects are free to alter or destroy all of the
essential datasets for the Monitor. Therefore, the Monitor is open
to sabotage from non-Monitor users.
A second area of vulnerability arises from the fact that all of
the programs within the Monitor are written in PL1, and run in User
Mode. If we give a PL1 programming class access to a version of the
Monitor which includes the ability to edit, compile, run and delete
PLl .programs, we face two problems: first, anything that the Monitor
does, they can do (for example, gain access to the User Profile Table,
and change the group nember to be billed for the session), and second,
the logical structure of TSO provides no method of keeping different
user's datasets apart in a single USERID, and releasing file maintenance
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commands gives unlimited access to all system datasets. Therefore, we
have relied upon the good nature of our students when using the Monitor
for more sophisticated applications.
The final chapter discusses the IBM Resource Security System, and
what additional security it will bring to the Class Monitor in the
OS/TSO environment.
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CHAPTER 4 - RSS AND CLASSROOM SUPPORT SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
In May of 1973, the IBM Resource Security System (RSS) was
installed at the MIT Computation Center as part of a study on operating
system security. RSS is designed as an addition to OS Release 21
which, when fully implemented (and debugged), provides the additional
software necessary to "secure" the operating system. Since extremely
detailed documentation is available for RSS [13, 14, 15], only a very
brief description will be given here.
RSS is a system primarily concerned with data security, and one
which clearly reflects its military ancestry (it was originally designed
for use in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System). System
resources (programs, datasets, and terminals) are accessed by users
on the basis of security levels, access categories, and need-to-know.
Security levels reflect the sensitivity of data, in a manner directly
analagous to the military "confidential, secret, and top secret" classi-
fication. Datasets are assigned one of eight security levels, and each
user has an attribute which sets a maximum permissable level of data
access. Access categories provide a means of implementing a group
need-to-know strategy by associating groups of users with groups of
system resources. For example, all of the administrative users in
a given department might be authorized to the set of confidential files
for that department. Finally, in the extreme case, individual users
can be authorized to specific datasets on a specific need-to-know basis.
Perhaps the most important reflection of the military design
strategy in RSS is the notion of the Security Officer. The control
of all security procedures within the system rests with the person (or
persons) designated as Security Officer. This control includes the
definition of access categories, maintenance of the security profiles
of all users, and the control of the authorization procedure for all
controlled datasets.
Through the authorization procedure described in [13], users are
given rights to datasets on the basis of their codewords, which specify
access categories, levels, and need-to-know. The RSS System then
monitors the use of all controlled datasets, and attempts to prevent
any access to the system which might subvert the control mechanism.
Since the MIT community has had little opportunity to observe
the system, we will not critique its effectiveness here. For interested
readers, some information on performance is available from Cornell
University [16]. We will, however, take a brief look at the potential
effectiveness of RSS in allieviating the security problems of the Class
Monitor. The chapter will conclude with some comments on the design
of operation systems for use in the Classroom Support Environment.
THE POTENTIAL OF RSS
When OS-360 was originally introduced, the designers were very
proud of the ease with which data in the system was accessed. It
was a very "open" system, and the most flexible available in terms of
file system organization. As the need for data protection became clear,
and TSO was added to the environment, RSS was developed to gain control
of the system. For the Class Monitor, this means the ability to protect
its control datasets from outside disturbances, and further, to authorize
the contents of those datasets to specific programs. For example, the
accounting file could be authorized only to LOGON, LOGOFF, and the
Master File Access Routine, thus preventing access by student programs.
However, it sould be noted here that even though this is a major improve-
ment in OS-TSO, the result is no advance in the state-of-the-art. Indeed,
there is some reason to believe that the design of a timesharing system
in which one user can access another user's files (or even know that
they exist) was a terrible mistake at best, and that dataset protection
in TSO in fact brings the design of the system up to a level just
below that of systems such as CP/CMS, since the user in TSO can still
find out that controlled datasets exist from the system catalog.
In the Classroom Support Environment, as noted in Chapter 3, a
very decentralized user community exists. Unfortunately, in RSS, only
the Security Officer can protect datasets and assign privileges. This
military notion of security centralization is in direct conflict with
the needs of our environment. This and other problems of RSS in a
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"service bureau" environment are discussed by Daley.
RSS provides no assistance in the other major area of difficulty,
that of preventing the user from accessing the User Profile Table and
other sensitive control tables during execution. Although RSS in most
cases can catch a user before the OS environment is affected, it offers
no assistance in maintaining the subsystem environment needed in our
application.
In summary, the addition of RSS to OS-360 provides some useful
control of sensitive datasets, but fails to provide the mechanisms
necessary for subsystem control, such as automatic user exits from
various sections of the TMP, and authorization mechanisms which operate
without the Security Officer. Much modification of TSO is needed
before the Class Monitor can be secured, and RSS must be extended to
include more specific authorizations, such as the execute-only access
and program-program-file permission discussed by Daley. RSS, while
solving many dataset access problems, falls short of the requirements
of the Classroom Environment.
65
CONCLUSIONS
Experience in the Classroom Environment at MIT has shown that a
decentralized approach such as the Class Monitor System provides the
necessary simplicity and computing power for students, as well as the
control required for administrators. Severe problems occur, however,
in attempting to provide adequate subsystem integrity. It seems clear
that any operating system which intends to service this environment
must include mechanisms for subsystem implementation which include
access (either by user exits or open entry points) to most major
modules of the system. File systems, accounting systems, command
processors, and many other areas must beavailable to provide adequate
subsystem security.
In conclusion, we should note that there are some viable alternatives
to the OS environment for Classroom Support. Madnick and Donovan18
make a strong case for the use of virtual machine systems in areas
where security is a problem. -Certainly this idea is appealing in attempt-
ing to isolate computer research, for example, from other campus activities.
Even with a class virtual machine, however, some mechanism will be required
to protect members of that class from one another, making some subsystem
necessary. The Multics design19 is one which makes the implementation
of subsystems somewhat easier.
The needs of the Classroom Support environment, then, are mainly
in the area of subsystem security. Hopefully, the work of the RSS Study
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Group at the Sloan School of Management will provide a framework for
analyzing these needs which will assist designers in meeting them more
completely.
REFERENCES
1. Levien, R.E., Blackwell, F.W., Comstock, G.A., Hawkins, M.L.,
Holland, W.B., Mosmann, C. The Emerging Technology: Instructional
Uses of the Computer in Higher Education, Preliminary Edition,
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1970.
2. Interview with Joseph Patten, Director, Office of Administrative
Information Systems, MIT on April 26, 1973.
3. Lavigne, Jean C., Porges, Denis, S.M. Thesis, MIT Sloan School,
A Management Information and Control System for a School and its
Applications to the Sloan School of Management, 1971.
4. Chaney, John F., "Data Management and Interrelated Data Systems for
Higher Education", Management Information Systems: Their Development
and Use in the Administration of Higher Education, Western Interstate
Commission for Higher Education, Boulder, Colorado., October 1969,
pp. 17-27.
5. Rand Corporation (op. cit.) p. 168.
6. IBM System/360 Principles of Operation, IBM Corporation,
Form GA22 - 6821.
7. IBM System/360 Operating System, Introduction, IBM Corporation,
Form GC28 - 6534.
8. IBM System/360 Operating System, Time-Sharing Option - Command
Language Reference, IBM Corporation, Form - GC28 - 6732.
9. IBM System/360 Operating System, Time-Sharing Option - Terminal
User's Guide, IBM Corporation, Form GC28 - 6763.
10. IBM System/360 Operating System, Time-Sharing Option - Guide to
Writing a Terminal Monitor Program or a Command Processor, IBM
Corporation, Form GC28 - 6764.
11. Hewitt, D. "Class Monitor System Programmer's Guide", Multilithed
Manual, East Campus Computer Facility, MIT, 1973.
12. Hewitt, D. "Class Monitor System User's Guide", Multilithed Manual
East Campus Computer Facility, MIT, 1972.
13. IBM OS/MVT With Resource Security: General Information and Planning
Manual, IBM Corporation, Form GH20 - 1058.
14. IBM OS/MVT with Resource Security: Installation and System Programmer
Guide, IBM Corporation, Form GH20 - 1021.
15. IBM OS/MVT with Resource Security: Security Officer's Guide, IBM
Corporation, Form GH20 - 1057.
16. Weiner, Herb. "An Analysis of Computer Software Security at Cornell,"
Working Paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, February, 1973.
17. Daley, Robert C., "Authorization and Disseminated Control in a
Resource Security System," Paper Presented at the IBM Quarterly
Security Conference, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April, 1973.
18. Madnick, S.E., and Donovan, J.J. "Application and Analysis of the
Virtual Machine Approach to Information System Security and Isola-
tion", Paper Presented at the ACM Workshop on Virtual Computer
Systems, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March, 1973.
19. Bensoussan, A., Clingen, C.T., Daley, R.C. "The Multics Virtual
Memory: Concepts and Design", Communication of the ACM, Volume 15,
Number 5, May, 1972.
